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Abstract 
This article provides a critical assessment of the assumptions and narratives 
underpinning the development of social policy initiatives targeting caring relationships 
based upon family ties. At the time of writing in late 2018, the impact of globalization 
has had a profound impact but we cannot underemphasise state power in examining 
care policy, theory and practice. Hence, deploying a narrative approach attention is 
drawn to the ways in which family identities are open to a far greater range of 
negotiation than is assumed by policy. Drawing on the United Kingdom as a case 
example, questions are posed about intergenerational relations and the nature of late 
life citizenship. The comparatively recent invention of narratives supporting ‘informal 
care’ and the link with neo-liberal and ‘third way’ notions of active citizenship are 
explored. As is the failure of policy developments to take into account the diversity of 
care giving styles and the complexity of caring relationships. It is argued that the 
uneven and locally specific ways in which policy develops enables the co-existence of 
a complex range of narratives about family, caring and ageing which address diverse 
aspects of the family life of older people in often contradictory ways. 
 
Introduction 
There has been a growing interest in informal care and old age within the European 
social policy and helping professions literature of recent years from Tony Blair to 
Gordon Brown to David Cameron to Theresa May (1, 2). The political reasons for such 
growth are as much social, economic as they are for academic reasons. The British 
government, in particular, has long recognized that informal care is important for social 
and economic needs and this should be replicated through an academic understanding 
of social policy associated with supporting families. However, the effects of 
globalization and the potential of intergenerational relations as a focus for the analysis 
of social change has been largely neglected also (3).  
The proliferation of adjuvant ideologies evolving out of burgeoning free-market 
economies along with an accompanying diffusion of instrumental rationality, 
standardization, commoditization or secularism have become embedded in our 
thinking, challenging all other relational metrics of daily life that impacts on how we 
view care and who manages it.  In the process, modes of interaction and standards of 
assessing relational status or personal worth are recast. In both developed and emerging 
economies the nature of work and the meaning of careers are also undergoing major 
reformulations.  There is a global softening of labor markets linked to downsizing of 
local employment opportunities, redundancies, a spate of subcontracting arrangements, 
and an economic volatility abetted by technological innovations that chip away at 
employment security, wage or benefit packages bringing a degree of economic and 
existential uncertainty to greater numbers of people. Of course, such changes are not 
distributed evenly across all forms of employment, further exacerbating inequalities.  
It should also be stressed that adversity does not appear to strike women and men 
equally – and it is certainly reasonable to say that disadvantage begets gendered 
disadvantage when downturns occur (29, 30). Women are disproportionately among 
the most disadvantaged and with age even greater hardships accrue to them. Adding to 
the intricacies of these unparalleled changes is the velocity with which they are taking 
place and the fact that they are accompanied by a deepening division between those 
whose principal pursuits are in subsistence or service sector markets and their 
counterparts who are primarily involved in large-scale export, international sectors, or 
equity markets. Together these forces are bringing about a profound imbalance within 
and between populations as one group shares in the generation of wealth while the 
other becomes increasingly dependent and is being subordinated to decisions made in 
the other sector, by a cartel half a world away (29).   
This is not to say that states are mere minions of transnational interests but it is no 
longer the case that nation-state sovereignty can be taken-for-granted in the care policy 
realm.  Nor is it necessarily the case that state policies are as all-powerful as they once 
were in shaping daily life (29).  The welfare state of the last century has been replaced 
by a competitive state of the 21st century, always mindful of its global positioning (30). 
Some propose that a parallel concept may provide insights into the vagaries of post-
industrial public-sector decision making. To make sense of domestic versus 
international priorities and their effect on daily life, scholars would do well to come to 
terms with the notion of “non-sovereign power” as it applies to social justice, autonomy, 
monetary policies and capital mobility, and other forms of extra-national pressures 
emending local care policies. It could be asserted that to date there has been a real lag 
between transnational developments and the way analysts think of social policies 
especially as applied to care.  Some attribute the stumbling blocks in conceptualization 
to the disjunctures between various vectors characterizing this world-in-motion that 
produce fundamental problems of livelihood, equity, suffering, justice, and governance 
(29). In this characterization, proximate social issues have causes that are hardly local 
and call for non-parochial perspectives if they are to be addressed. 
One of the most significant impacts of globalization is that it has brought an 
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way 
that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa 
(8). As a consequence, few governments are eager to make decisions separately from 
their reliance on global enterprise; it is as though they are in a situation of shared 
sovereignty, having to negotiate between domestic, international, corporatist and 
transnational interests (29).  NGOs such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund have also become architectural partners in local policy deliberations by 
sanctioning preferred welfare policies as a condition of their support of monetization 
(30).  Even so, nation-states nonetheless serve important administrative functions in a 
world dominated by transnational corporate interests and it is unlikely that 
governmental responsibilities are either going to be usurped or allowed to wither in 
light of their functionality (29).  It is not too far fetched to say that certain transnational 
interests see themselves as having universal jurisdiction, assertions of state autonomy 
notwithstanding. 
With the spreading of these transformations has come a reshuffling of local priorities, 
with governmental emoluments directed or redirected to areas defined as having the 
greatest public importance and bringing the greatest returns. Of course the realities 
behind that assertion are deserving of close scrutiny as the policy process is 
unquestionably political and the state must mediate rival claims as it serves as the 
principal mechanism by which revenues are collected and resources 
distributed.  Meanwhile, social entitlements, expenditures and daily experience for 
people who may not fully grasp the raison d'être behind their situations reflect these 
same priorities.   It has been suggested that social policy regimes are regularly structured 
to be consistent with other forms of social stratification within a nation state such as 
the UK (29).  To the extent there is a convergence in social welfare policies around the 
globe it might not be mere coincidence that social stratification and social class divisions 
are growing more pronounced in the face of globalization that lie at the heart of care 
relations.  In light of global economic flows, the salience and permeability of national 
borders, whether in Europe, the western hemisphere, or in the East are a different 
matter than they were even half a century ago (29). In terms of domestic care policies, 
the impact of international economic relations has recontoured the landscape, so to 
speak, all the way to the regionalization and appropriation of economic relations.  What 
were once bold lines of demarcation are now dotted lines more suggestive of 
administrative spheres than jingoistic borders. In the global century, deregulated 
markets are tightly integrated with political and social transformations, affecting local 
circumstances and communality (4, 29).    All in all, the globalizing influences of the 
early 21st century are producing a distinctive era in social history linked to the 
emergence of transnational actors as well as economics and technologies that are 
helping fuel the shifts. Global economic change portends more than alterations in per 
capita income, the nature of financial products and currency markets, or the rapid 
circulation of goods, communication or technologies. It is precursor to broad cultural 
and political shifts that challenge pre-contact arrangements, notions of social justice 
and solidarity, as well as local interaction patterns. In a post-modern world, 
globalization is creating interlocking dependencies linked to the ways in which 
priorities are ordained by interests that impact on care and the family. Global pressures 
play a key role on nation states. However, nation states themselves have enormous 
ideological power to shape the interests of care; what it means; who it impacts on and 
how does it leave the family? 
This paper faces up to this challenge and takes the UK as a case example which can shed 
light on wider global trends associated with caring, family and ageing. Conceptually, 
‘family’ is ‘taken for granted’ as a term and is not with a fixed meaning (4). Policy makers 
and politicians, for example often use the idea of the family in their attempts to shape 
social relationships such as informal caring. In common-sense everyday language, 
people indicate what they mean by family when they are interacting with each other. 
As we become aware of the increasing fluidity of age-based roles and relationships and 
the multiple influences that impinge on family behaviour, it has also become attractive 
to view families and family members as ‘living’ by certain scripts. To understand 
families and informal care, we must recognize that the meaning of the family changes 
in response to a wide variety of social, economic, political, cultural and inter-personal 
conditions. Policy is both an attempt to shape and is itself shaped by these meanings. 
Modern social systems depend upon families. One reason is that children come to be 
citizens because of the instruction and training provided in the private life of families 
(5). Indeed, it is in families that people are expected to learn what it is to become a 
responsible citizen. Western governments generally assume an organization of society 
that requires families to perform work of caring for its members. In the UK, for example 
much politicking has surrounded family life, including controversies over informal care 
coupled with single parenting, financial support by absent fathers and proposed legal 
reforms concerning divorce, domestic violence and family homes (1). Policy discourses 
have centred on marking changes in the ways women, men, children and ‘wider family’ 
members inter-relate, have relationships with one another and the consequences of 
such changes for individuals and for society as a whole. The popularization of 
‘narrativity’ has increased in the social sciences, both as a method of undertaking 
research (6) and as a technique for modifying the self (7, 8). Davidson (9) suggests that 
older people construct their own analytical models of personal identity based on lived 
experience and on narratives already existing in their everyday environments. By using 
a narrative approach, the meaning of family can be told through stories about the self 
as well as ones ‘at large’ in public discourse (30). Self-storying, draws attention to the 
ways in which family identities are both more open to negotiation and are more likely 
to be owned and worked on by individuals themselves. Families are made up of 
interpersonal relationships within and between generations that are subject to both the 
formal rhetoric of public discourse, and the selfstories that connect them together. The 
notion of family is, then, an amalgam of policy discourse and everyday negotiation and 
as such alerts us to the wider social implications of those relationships for the social 
construction of informal care. The rhetoric of social policy and the formal 
representations of adult ageing and family life that one finds there, provide a source of 
material for the construction of identity and a series of spaces in which such identities 
can be performed and surveillance maintained (9). It is perhaps not overstating the case 
to say that the ‘success’ of a family policy can be judged from the degree to which people 
live within the stories of family created by it. Indeed, the relationship between families 
and social policy has been consecutively rewritten in the social policy literature. Each 
time a different story has been told and alternative aspects of the relationship have been 
thrown into high relief. It might even be argued that the family has become a key site 
upon which expected norms of late life citizenship are being built. The structure of the 
article is in four parts. First, we start by mapping out the emergence and consolidation 
of neoliberal family policy and its relationship to and emphasis on family obligation, 
state surveillance and active citizenship. Secondly, we highlight both the ideological 
continuities and discontinuities of the social democratic ‘turn’ and their effects on older 
people and the family. Thirdly, research studies are drawn on to highlight how ‘family’ 
has been recognized by governments in recent years, as a particular way of ‘storying’ 
the relationship between carers and cared for. Finally, we explore ramifications for 
researching family policy and old age by pointing out that narratives of inclusion and 
exclusion often coexist. A neoliberal story of family and informal care Political debate 
since the Thatcher years, has been dominated by neoliberalism, which argues the 
existence of autonomous, assertive, rational individuals who must be protected and 
liberated from ‘big government’ (1, 3). Indeed, Walker and Naegele (10) claim a startling 
continuity across Europe is the way ‘the family’ has been positioned by governments as 
these ideas have spread beyond their original ‘English-speaking’ base. Neoliberal 
policies on the family, have almost always started from a position of laissez-faire, 
excepting when extreme behaviour threatens its members or wider social relations. 
Using the UK as a case example, it can be seen that that neoliberal policy came to focus 
on two main issues. Whilst both only represent the point at which a minimalist 
approach from the state touches family life, they come to mark the dominant narrative 
through which ageing and family are made visible in the public domain. On the one 
hand, increasing attention was paid to the role families took in the care of older people 
who were either mentally or physically infirm. A series of policy initiatives (11, 12) 
recognized that families were a principal source of care and support. ‘Informal’ family 
care became a key building block of policy towards an ageing population. It both 
increased the salience of traditional family values, independence from government and 
enabled a reduction in direct support from the state. Wider economic priorities, to ‘roll 
back the state’ and thereby release resources for individualism had become translated 
into a family discourse about caring obligations and the need to enforce them. If families 
ceased to care, then the state would have to pick up the bill. It was not that families 
were spoken of as being naturally abusive. Neither was the ‘discovery’ of familial abuse 
linked to community care policy outside academic debate (13). Discourses on the rise 
of abuse and on informal care remained separate in the formal policy domain. However, 
a subtle change of narrative tone had taken place. Families, rather than being seen as 
‘havens against a harsh world’, were now easily perceived as potential sites of 
mistreatment, and the previously idealized role of the unpaid carer became that of a 
potential recalcitrant, attempting to avoid their family obligations (14). Although it 
appeared that familial caring was actually moving away from relationships based on 
obligation and towards those based on negotiation (15). Family commitment has been 
shown by Bengtson and Achenbaum (16) to vary depending upon the characteristic 
caregiving patterns within particular families. Individualistic families provided less 
instrumental help and made use of welfare services, whereas a second, collectivist 
pattern offered greater personal support. Bengtson et al. (17) observed that ‘tightknit’ 
and ‘detached’ family styles were often common across generations. Unfortunately, 
policy developments have rarely taken differences in caregiving styles into account, 
preferring a narrative of idealized role relationships.  
A ‘new labour’ trend? Social democracy, family and caring 
Social democratic policies towards the family arose from the premise that by the early 
1990s, the free-market policies of the Thatcher years had seriously damaged the social 
fabric of the nation state. A turn to ‘the third way’, emerging under Clinton, Blair and 
Schroeder administrations in the US and parts of Europe, attempted to find means of 
mending that social fabric, and as part of it, relations between older people and their 
families. The direction that the new policy narrative took is summarized in UK Prime 
Minister Blair’s (1996) statement that ‘The most meaningful stake anyone can have in 
society is the ability to earn a living and support a family’ (3). Work, or failing that, 
care-like activities, slowly began to emerge, delineating new narratives. According to 
Giddens (18), a new partnership is needed between government and civil society. 
Government support to the renewal of community through local initiative, gives an 
increasing role to ‘voluntary’ organizations, and significantly, supports the ‘democratic’ 
family characterized by mutual respect, autonomy, decision-making through 
communication and freedom of violence. It is argued that social policy should be less 
concerned with ‘equality’ and more with ‘inclusion’, with community participation 
reducing moral and financial dependence. Through an increased awareness of the 
notion of ageism, the influence of European ideas about social inclusion and North 
American social communitarianism, families and older people found themselves 
transformed into ‘active citizens’ who should be encouraged to participate in society, 
rather than as a burden upon it (19, 20). A UK policy document, entitled Building a 
Better Britain for Older People, is typical of a new genre of western policy, re-storying 
the role of older people: ‘The contribution of older people is vital, both to families, and 
to voluntary organizations and charities. We believe their roles as mentors – providing 
ongoing support and advice to families, young people and other older people – should 
be recognized. Older people already show a considerable commitment to volunteering. 
The Government is working with voluntary groups and those representing older people 
to see how we can increase the quality and quantity of opportunities for older people 
who want to volunteer’ (21). Older people are portrayed as holding a key role in the 
stability of both the public sphere, through caring, work and volunteering, and in the 
private sphere, primarily through support and advice to younger people. Paradoxically, 
the family also provides a site for voluntary activity and active citizenship through the 
support of informal caring relationships (22). The social relations of informal care There 
are nearly six million people providing informal care in the UK (22) of which, over half, 
care for someone over the age of 75 years. However, only 18% of people involved in 
caring report the effects of age as the main reason for the person requiring care. At the 
same time there is little UK research directly related to calculating the risk of requiring 
care in older age and what there is has been based on USA insurance models (23). The 
notion of informal care has a recent and complex history in social policy. Generally 
taken to name the activity of caring for another person in a private dwelling outside of 
a formal arrangement for payment and underpinned by obligations structured by 
marital or family ties, this apparent simplicity fails to represent the complexity and 
diversity of caring relationships. The idea that informal care has a recent history should 
not obscure the fact that caring relationships have existed between people across 
millennium, nor that obligation to weaker or impaired members of families and 
communities has not been addressed through a range of formal and informal activities. 
However, alongside the narratives of family life, it is important to dispense with 
Romanic notions of a ‘Golden Age’ of family and community care. In the UK, we only 
need to look to the legacy of the Poor Law and its discursive product of the deserving 
and undeserving poor (29). The material presence of this legacy in large scale 
institutions (hospitals) for older people remained a key characteristic of social 
intervention well into the last quarter of the 20th century (1, 23). If we take up a 
position in the 1970s, carers are largely invisible in social policy discourse while 
informal care as a category of intervention and need has yet to be invented. As noted 
earlier, this change emerged with the neoliberal restructuring of welfare regimes across 
the western world in which a discourse of the primacy of the family and family 
obligation is promoted and reinforced through social policy. Enshrined in statements 
such as the subsidiarity principle in the EU the idea that the family is the first and most 
important source of social welfare and support became articulated in the policy 
narratives of family life (24). As noted earlier, a series of policy initiatives in the UK 
recognized the role of families as the principle source of support Carers emerge as a 
target of social policy in the late 1980s and along with this informal care is invented as 
both the aim and product of social intervention. In line with neoliberal discourse the 
narratives of family life provide two options for families looking to support a frail or 
impaired member both of which involve forms of privatization: a privatization via the 
family or a privatization via the market. Through a perverse set of conditions the market 
option expanded rapidly in the UK in the 1990s largely fuelled by older people being 
moved out of the large state institutions rather than older people or their families 
choosing this option. Paradoxically, concerns over informal care focused on the 
obligations of families and the disproportionate way this impacted on women, and the 
contradictions between a narrative of obligation and the emergence of new categories 
of abuse and neglect. However, within a decade the neoliberal hegemony had given 
way to a new social–democratic position which while retaining much of the narrative 
around the primacy of the family also accepted a level of diversity in family-like 
arrangements not tolerated within the previous narrative. At the same time, the 
background of economic slowdown that provided the context for much of the earlier 
targeting of the family had given way to a more dynamic economic situation with larger 
numbers of women being drawn into the labour market (22). The policy narrative took 
up a version of a social citizenship based on work and community activity, and as part 
of this narrative a new partnership between carers and the state was described. The 
obligation to care for a relative or family member became partly disentangled from the 
discourse of family responsibility where the duty to care came as an implicit part of the 
marriage contract. The narrative of the family is then re-articulated with a quality of 
life discourse that proposed a number of expectations carers could hold of the state. 
Central to this was the expectation that carers can remain in work if they wish where 
they will receive protection of employment and pension rights. Moreover, the 
communitarian elements of the government narrative promoted not only the civil good 
of informal care but also promoted the civic responsibility to support carers with a new 
corps of volunteers (30). Despite this package and the support of a communitarian 
discourse there remain tensions and contradictions around the obligation to care and 
levels of compensation. Government: while acknowledging the potential financial costs 
of caring should the willingness or ability of people to engage in informal care decline; 
is nevertheless concerned not to provide levels of compensation, in particular financial 
compensation, which might undermine the moral commitment felt by carers. This 
could have perverse consequences for caring (23). At the same time, the obligation to 
care is reinforced by the explicit suggestion that the alternative, residential care, could 
have a detrimental effect on person (22, 24). This is accompanied by state powers to 
sequestrate the financial assets of individuals receiving market-based solutions to care. 
The analyses of the way discourses are embedded in policy has been criticized for 
neglecting the personal level where an even more complex set of narratives are at play. 
Recently, policy has focused on integrated health and social care (29). Such Engagement 
in care brings together in an unstable relationship two discourses: one relates to doing 
health care i.e. the range of activities a person might engage in while supporting another 
person, while the other relates to being caring: a more complex proposition that 
involves emotional labour and a felt responsibility for another individual[s] (29). 
Alongside the complex interplay of this narrative of doing care and being caring comes 
recognition that the boundaries between formal and informal care are unstable. Paid 
carers often report a sense of obligation to people they are supporting beyond what they 
are employed to do. Studies of paid care in both the USA and the UK have illustrated 
the permeability of the boundaries between labour, intimacy and love (25, 26). 
Moreover, the hierarchical relationship between the dependent and the independent, 
as painted in the policy narrative between the cared for, carer and voluntary worker, 
fails to grasp the reciprocal relationships within caring where emotional bonds and a 
sense of satisfaction help to cement the dynamics of informal care. This narrative is 
further destabilized when discourses of gender, sexuality and race are taken into 
account: where, for example, same sex caring relationships may take place in a different 
set of ‘spaces’ other than the home (27); or, in the context of ethnic languages, such as 
many Asian languages, where there is no narrative through which to discuss the 
relations described here as informal care (28).  
Conclusion:  
The commodification of care services and relentless obligation to informal care, as it is 
sometimes called, is abetted by a transfer of issues of citizenship to a forum which is no 
longer native in its scope but transnational; marked by intergovernmental structures, 
multinational corporate influence and population changes (29).   There is another layer 
of complexity added by a worldwide tendency to view a number of social issues through 
a medical lens (30) and the insecurities experienced by the citizenry in general are 
without parallel in world history. What might be described as apodictic, self-evident 
truths of tradition tend to lose their currency and help demarcate generational and 
participatory categories from one another.   
In the face of an unswerving drive to be players on the world’s stage, enhance market 
share and survive economic rip-tides, nation-states must balance the demands of 
competing claimants – leaving them few options but to make hard choices.  Not only 
do they have to adjudicate where to put scarce resources and which groups are 
deserving of protection or support, but few actions are indemnified against the next 
economic shortfall meaning they will have to review their priorities anew each time 
the economic tides turn.  It has always been true that in times of plenty promises about 
solutions to societal woes are an easy pledge to make; during times of scarcity it is a 
different story and keeping even the best-intentioned promises oftentimes creates real 
conflicts. Societal-level redefinitions of what is fair and just are a common means to 
solutions that do not always do well by citizens in need of assistance, undermining 
personal sense of security and identity as well as social solidarity (29). 
An illustration of a macro-level problem may be helpful for thinking about the type of 
quandary involved.  As nation-states undergo economic development via participation 
in global commerce, per capita incomes generally increase, never mind for the moment 
internal disparities, life expectancies increase and demands for healthcare mount (30). 
Continued change and desires to remain viable in the global economy mean a country 
will face enduring challenges in providing social safety nets, medical interventions or 
financing health care protections. To focus on just the health care issue: despite 
subsidized provisions for indigent citizens, most healthcare coverage around the world 
is linked to employment and economic productivity (workfare) and as employment is 
destabilized so too is care (29).  Needless to say, employment-based systems are costly, 
leading to cost shifting which also serves to grant license to employers to cut jobs and 
move production around to minimize the expense of doing business (5, 8, 29).  For those 
not covered by employment-based plans, subsidized coverage is oftentimes available 
but financed by taxes and premiums or by governmentally mandated insurance groups 
saddled with high expectations and expenditures. But social policies supportive of 
indigent care for those not involved in economically productive activities are often 
singled out as a cost sink and are among the first issues put on cost-cutting agenda (30).   
In order to comprehend the underpinning of certain forms of inequalities it is also 
important to examine some of the transformations that are altering people’s lives. One 
post-modernist reality of the 21st century is the existence of a digital divide between 
those who have always known how to navigate in key-stroke technologies and those 
“ancients” who learned it later or not at all.  Those who are comfortable with the 
technology have the world at their fingertips and no longer depend on local 
relationships or role models for solace or validation.  The result is an indisputable social 
segmentation (29).  Whatever norms of reciprocity had existed before are likely to falter 
and fray under the impact of interdicting worldviews in which the deep grammar of 
sociability is no longer meaningful to those versed in the newer modes of care activity. 
At the same time, there is an erosion of communities of like minds with shared 
representations cutting across society at large and fostering social solidarity.  Instead 
they are replaced by segmented, smaller communities and a blurring of ways of 
knowing the world. Globalization has thus created an identity crisis, since many are 
neither local nor global and are overloaded with changing stimul resulting in a ‘don’t 
care’ attitude, commercial interactions among family members, a rise of individualism 
and a disequilibrium (30) The problem here is that care is being seen as a domain for 
the family or private profit by government.  
Transnational private enterprises cannot be ignored as they are altering the landscape 
but they are not doing so single-handedly.  It is fair to say there are both private and 
semi-public but non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved.  Multilateral NGOs 
are playing an especially crucial role and certainly a role that is influencing developing 
countries as they sort out their welfare regimes in terms of care and “contracting 
out”.  For example, since the issuance of the Berg Report in 1981, the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have become major players on the world’s stage 
oftentimes stipulating structural adjustments and preferred policies nation-states 
should adopt as a condition of support and in order to attract direct capital investments 
or other fiscal cooperation, including monetization. One illustration is that the World 
Bank began urging diminutions in pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension provisions in favor 
of means-tested pensions and private provisions in the mid-1990s (29).  The World 
Bank and the IMF have been staunch advocates for over three decades for broadly 
defined market-led welfare policies as a preferred alternative to un- or under-funded 
public care services (17).  Encapsulating both the criticisms and the confluence of forces 
fueling such a movement, some assert that the drive for economic integration pays 
precious little attention to nation-building, national interests or public sector regulatory 
control in relation to care (30)  As a consequence, even nonprofit, social enterprises 
tend to be doing good badly (29). 
Although there is a remarkable absence of consensus, social care is customarily taken 
to mean statutory governmental intervention designed to provide supportive services 
and resources to those in need.  Right away one question that has to be addressed 
revolves around eligibility requirements and stipulations of entitlement.  Such issues as 
gender are very much a part of the state, as are discussions of family responsibilities and 
care policies. At the risk of extreme simplification, whether women’s narratives are 
eligible for social benefits and services in their own rights or as members of a male-
breadwinner family is an abiding question whenever care regimes are examined. By the 
same token, gender ideologies are very much an aspect of poverty, labor markets and 
other market experiences, or the myriad inequalities that cut across the life course and 
through virtually every facet of experience especially in the UK (29,30). 
Social policy development in the UK is subject to local emphasis and elision, which 
means that it is possible for different, even conflicting narratives of family care and later 
life to coexist in different parts of the policy system. Each political period generates a 
discourse that can legitimate the lives of older people and family relations in particular 
ways, and as their influence accrues, create the potential of entering into varied 
narrative streams. A key feature of recent social policy history has been that not only 
have the formal policies been quite different in their tenor and tacit objectives, one 
from another, they have also addressed different areas of the lives of members of 
families. Where there is little narrative overlap there is the possibility of both policies 
existing, however opposed they may be ideologically or in terms of outcome It is 
possible to see contemporary social policy addressing diverse aspects of the family life 
of older people in contradictory ways. Contradictory narratives for the family exist in a 
landscape that is at one and the same time increasingly blurred in terms of roles and 
relationships and split-off in terms of narrative coherence. Indeed in a future of 
complex and multiple policy agendas, it would appear that a narrative of social inclusion 
through ‘active ageing’ can coexist with one emphasizing carer obligation and 
surveillance. Such a co-existence may occasionally become inconvenient at the level of 
public rhetoric. Diverse yet co-existing policy narratives may become a significant 
source of risk to identity maintenance within the family. One has to imagine a situation 
in which family lives are lived, skating on a surface of legitimizing discourse and policy 
narratives (30). However, nation-states such as the UK still serve important 
administrative functions in a world dominated by increasingly transnational corporate 
interests. With few options and having to make hard choices, care provision has seen 
trends toward commodification of social care while both globalization and state power 
is affecting social contracts as well. In the face of all these challenges to justice and 
governance, there must be a twin track approach: social welfare needs to be redefined 
and extended while market economy must be guided by moral principles that embody 
fundamental human values for every member of every family requiring care (29). 
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